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SUMMARY
Malicious activities have become a primary security threat after hosts are infected. Attackers typically use
HTTP to carry out malicious activities, such as botnets, click fraud and phishing, as they can easily hide
among the large amount of benign HTTP traffic. The User-Agent (UA) field in the HTTP header carries
information on the application, OS, device, etc., and adversaries fake UA strings as a way to evade detection.
Motivated by this, we propose a novel grammar-guided UA string classification method in HTTP flows. We
leverage the fact that a number of “standard” applications, such as web browsers and iOS mobile apps, have
well-defined syntaxes that can be specified using context-free grammars, and we extract OS, device and other
relevant information from them. We develop association heuristics to classify UA strings that are generated
by “non-standard” applications that do not contain OS or device information. We provide case studies that
demonstrate how our approach can be used to identify malicious applications that generate fake UA strings
to engage in fraudulent activities.
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21. INTRODUCTION
HTTP has become the de facto application-layer “transport” protocol, over which many applications
such as JSON, SOAP, gaming, VoIP, video streaming, and software updates operate. From the
perspectives of network measurement and traffic analysis, it is important to be able to classify and
separate various applications transported over HTTP. Such capability is particularly useful in aiding
network security tasks such as malware detection, mainly because HTTP has become the main
medium for illicit activities on the Internet such as drive-by downloads [18], phishing [19], botnet
command-and-control (C&C) [20], click frauds [24], and so forth.
Given a collection of HTTP flow traces (i.e., network traffic over TCP port 80) passively captured
within a network where HTTP and TCP/IP header information is collected, we are interested in
developing an effective and robust method to classify and separate various applications transported
over HTTP. To aid network security monitoring, our emphasis is on identifying anomalous
applications such as “handcrafted” web clients that mimic “standard” browsers or malicious
applications that conduct fraudulent activities such as click frauds. To this end, we want to robustly
separate HTTP flows generated by normal, benign applications such as legitimate web browsers
(e.g., Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome) and other commonly used applications (e.g., iOS or
Android mobile apps) from “anomalous” applications.
One key feature we focus on is the User-Agent (UA) HTTP header field, which is sent by
a web browser to a web server to convey the client’s operating system, browser type and version,
the rendering engine, and the application name in the case of traffic from mobile devices [25]. Web
servers utilize such information to customize their response to the web browser for proper rendering.
However, the UA string is also used by malware for illicit activities, for instance, as a way to spoof a
legitimate browser being used by a client on click fraud events, as a way to leak personal information
from the infected host, or to communicate with the Command-and-Control (C&C) server [12]. More
recently, the UA string has been used as a way to exploit servers vulnerable to the Shellshock [11]
attack.
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differentiate between legitimate and malicious UA strings. The reasons are two-fold. First, although
there is a standard UA format defined in RFC 7231 [8], not all benign applications follow it (e.g.
Table V), which limits the possibility of filtering HTTP connections with non-standard UA strings.
Second, if a malicious UA string is following the standard format, there is no obvious way to detect
it, except for point solutions as we describe in related work.
Due to the diversity of UA strings, the state-of-the-art mechanisms for processing UA strings
utilize a set of (ad hoc) pattern matching heuristics based on regular expression (regex) rules (see,
e.g., [7]). These tools are designed for web servers to recognize browsers for content rendering, not
for separating normal browsers from anomalous ones. They are generally ineffective in recognizing
non browser applications that often include partial information (e.g., only the name of an application
but no OS or device type) in an application-specific format or even a random-looking character string
(see Section 5 for examples).
In this paper, we present a novel approach to robustly separate and classify applications
transported over HTTP using the UA strings, with the goal of detecting malicious applications or
activities. This approach consists of two components. 1) We develop a novel context-free grammar
(CFG)-based method for efficiently and robustly parsing the UA strings generated by “standard”
applications such as common web browsers, iOS and Android apps. 2) To cope with “non-standard”
applications with (possibly arbitrarily formatted) UA strings that contain only partial or little
information about the application (e.g., OS-type), we leverage the associations between the UA
strings and hostnames contained in the HTTP flows to classify “non-standard” applications which
generate these UA strings. For example, although many anti-virus (AV) engines often generate
HTTP flows with “random-looking” UA strings, we observed that these flows are always directed to
well known AV company websites (e.g., kaspersky.com)). We combine these two components
to build profiles of various known applications based on information extracted from UA strings.
Then, deviations of these profiles can be used as indicators of potentially anomalous activities,
generated by “malicious” applications running at an infected device.
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methodology. The monitored network is mostly residential, with high-speed ADSL connections to
the Internet. The collected data includes all inbound/outbound TCP connections to the network. The
dataset contains only the TCP and HTTP header information (the HTTP payload was not analyzed
and the IP addresses were anonymized to preserve privacy). Our dataset includes over 40 million
HTTP connections from over 15, 000 unique client IP addresses. After the data collection, malicious
flows were labeled by a commercial IDS.
In summary, our contributions are three-fold: (i) We develop a novel CFG-based parser for
classifying UA strings generated by “standard” applications over HTTP that is modular and
more effective than the state-of-art regex-based tools (see Section 4). (ii) We develop a novel
UA string-hostname association method for classifying UA strings generated by many “non-
standard” applications (see Section 5). (iii) We incorporate these mechanisms into a proof-of-
concept system (see Section 3 for an overview of the overall methodology and system) which
builds application profiles based on information extracted from the UA strings and employs several
inference mechanisms to identify anomalous UA strings/applications. We tested our system in a
24-hour network trace from a nation-wide Internet Service Provider (ISP), and present a number
of case studies to illustrate how various attacks with different artifacts such as non-standard UA
strings, and “fake” UA strings that mimic standard cases can be detected (see Section 6).
2. RELATED WORK
There has been a variety of heuristics and tools proposed for classifying UA strings, most of which
are developed to help web servers identify the client browsers so as to provide appropriate web
content. Many of these methods simply rely on building and maintaining a database of various UA
strings seen in the wild (e.g., browscap.ini and borwscap.dll used by Windows web servers [6]).
Others combine such methods with regular expression based classification rules [7, 13], where a
laundry list of rules is supplied by individuals and accumulated over time. Our experience in using
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complexity of the rules and the large variation of the UA string formats. In addition, these rules
become difficult to debug and manage as they grow in size.
This motivated us to try MAUL [21], which is a machine learning (ML) based UA classification
scheme. The problem with ML based schemes is its high false classification rates, as it cannot
distinguish slight differences between valid and invalid UA strings. For instance, invalid UA strings
such as “Mozilla Mozilla Mozilla” or “Chrome Mozilla Windows” will be classified as browsers. In
contrast, context-free grammar based classification scheme not only classifies standard UA strings
more accurately, but also detects syntactic errors and other anomalies in browser-like UA strings.
Finally, UA strings have also been utilized to detect malicious activities, e.g., for detecting SQL
injection attack [14]. In particular, Kheir [23] finds that anomalous UA strings are often associated
with malware activities. We apply our grammar-based UA parsing method to show how they can be
systematically utilized to detect not only malicious applications with unique “strange-looking” UA
strings, but also those that attempt to mimic normal applications.
3. WALKTHROUGH
In this section, we walkthrough the paper, which includes the motivation for our work and an
overview of our methodology and proof-of-concept system design.
3.1. Motivation for our work
Initially, we noticed that existing methods to classify UA strings were used mainly by web servers to
improve page rendering, and they were solely based on regular expressions (regexes). The regexes
are organized in a hierarchy and there is a parsing library that will iterate over them. For a given
UA string, the parsing library will try to match a regex in the first level of the hierarchy, which
tries to match a browser name (e.g. Firefox or Chrome). Then, the library will iterate over all
regexes in all subsequent levels until one rule matches completely. In our experiments, we found
that these methods are hard to extend, and are extremely slow for network monitoring environments.
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monitoring the network may see millions of UA strings per second. Therefore, the iterative matching
over regexes is not scalable or suitable for ISPs. Fortunately, regexes plus the library composed of
if/else statements can be easily expressed using a Context Free Grammar (CFG). In addition, CFGs
are easy to extend, they walk the grammar tree quickly, and are more efficient than iterating over
regexes. Consequently, we chose to build our prototype using a CFG engine that identifies standard
UA strings.
3.2. Methodology
An accurate CFG engine is critical to identify standard UA strings. Hence, we propose a semi-
manual process to write the CFG engine. This process is composed of three phases: (1) extract UA
strings from sandbox environments, (2) extract UA strings from network traces, and (3) write the
CFG using standard UA strings from phases one and two. In phase one, a sandbox environment
can be used to run different versions of popular web browsers, and their popular plugins. Then,
the generated UA strings are added to a repository with a metadata string, which describes the
UA strings in the extracted group (e.g. UA strings for Firefox running on Windows with Firebug
plugin are added to the repository with metadata “Firefox, Windows, Firebug”). In phase two, we
use UA strings extracted from HTTP requests in real ISP network traces and we manually extract
the standard UA strings. We speed up the manual process by using regexes. For instance, we extract
all UA strings containing “Firefox”, then we manually reject all the non-standard ones, and add the
standard UA strings to the repository with their corresponding metadata. In phase three, we use the
standard UA strings in the repository to incrementally write the CFG (e.g. we write CFG for Firefox
UA strings, then we add another group of UA strings until we get the complete CFG). We use this
CFG engine in our prototype to identify standard UA strings.
Unfortunately, non-standard UA strings lack structure and cannot be identified using CFGs.
However, after manually analyzing our ISP network traces, we found that some non-standard UA
strings possess characteristics that can be used to develop heuristics to group them together. For
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software updates. These UA strings are highly random and a UA string shows up only once since it
includes a cryptographic hash of information that AV is sending to the remote server. However AV
related UA strings are always associated to a AV company domain name, such as symantec.com.
We use such characteristics to develop a detection engine for non-standard UA strings.
3.3. System Overview
Figure 1 illustrates a proof of concept for our system. The input to the CFG engine is the HTTP
flows per client IP, and the output is the standard UA strings and the non-standard UA strings.
First, the standard UA strings are used to create a profile for each application instance running
on a single machine, where this profile includes browsers (types and versions), OS (types and
versions), devices (e.g, Mac, iPad, PC, etc.), and applications (e.g., mobile apps). These profiles
are used later by the inference engines to find anomalies and suspicious activities. Second, the non-
standard UA strings are fed into the Flow Grouper, where UA strings are grouped based on top
two level domain names, e.g., all UA strings with domain names symantec.com are grouped
together. Then, Hostname Association uses a set of heuristics to label UA strings that poses similar
characteristics (see Section 5). Some UA strings might still be unknown, and therefore we fall back
to other source of information like googling them to process these UA strings. Then, the inference
engines are used to search for conflicting or anomalous UA strings (see Section 6). Finally, the
system produces a report of benign and malicious activities.
4. DESIGNING APPLICATION PROFILES FOR STANDARD UA STRINGS
We describe our approach to parse standard UA strings and extract key information from them, such
as browser type and operating system. We begin by describing regex-based UA string parsers, a
technique typically used in the industry today, and its limitations. Next, we present our UA string
parser, which consists of a series of per-application context free grammars.
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Figure 1. System Architecture
4.1. Parsing UA Strings with Regular Expressions
A straightforward solution to this problem is to build a huge list of regexes that represents all
possible UA strings in the Internet today. In such a system, an incoming UA string is matched
against the list of regexes and the first one that matches is used to extract any key information from
the string. BrowserScope [7] is an example of this approach. However, this method has several
problems:
An inappropriate regex matching order can cause false positives. Short regexes are typically
less strict than long regexes and tend to match more often. This can cause false positives. For
instance, consider the following UA string: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.0.3)
Gecko/20060426 Firefox/1.5.0.3 (.NET CLR 3.5.30729) GoogleToolbarFF 3.0.20070525. This is the UA string
of Firefox using the GoogleToolbar extension. However, if shorter regexes that match Firefox flows
are tested first, the application is mislabeled as Firefox, instead of GoogleToolbar.
A linear scan over many regexes is required and degrades performance. In most cases, a single
standard UA string will be matched against multiple regexes before a match is found, since there
is no optimization in the regexes to match. Furthermore, in the case of non-standard UA strings,
all the regexes in the long list might have to be matched. These cases might cause performance
degradation. A possible solution is to build different lists of regexes that serve different purposes
e.g., one regex list to match possible devices, and another regex list to match possible operating
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to linearly scan each individual list to find different components. In addition, a potential problem is
that because there are dependencies between device, OS and application, which are ignored in this
approach, some fraudulent matches might be considered as valid standard UA strings. In Section 6,
we describe an approach to solve this issue.
Some UA strings cannot be expressed by regular expressions. In our dataset, we found the
case where web browsers are embedded in third party applications, which generate nested UA
strings that look like the one below: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0;
GTB7.3; Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) ; (R1 1.6); .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR
2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; msn OptimizedIE8;ITIT). These nested UA strings
cannot be expressed using standard regexes, because they are not regular [22].
Updating heuristic rules is not flexible. Updating heuristic rules in regular expression based
system is an important operation if the system were to be widely deployed in practice. Clearly, such
a system need to be updated as new versions of the application are released. However, the core of
such a system is a laundry list of regular expressions. It is not flexible to make it updated because the
newly added rules can confuse existing regex-based method. For instance, new versions of Opera
(Opera 15+) have adopted a different format, where the old formats always contain the keyword
“Opera” (either at the beginning or the end), but the new ones end with “OPR/[version]” [15].
To alleviate all these limitations above, we build per-application context-free grammar parsers for
UA strings, which we describe in next subsection.
4.2. Parsing UA Strings with BNF-based Context Free Grammars
To parse UA strings, we first identify the UA strings generated by popular applications such as
commonly used web browsers and iOS-based apps which have a well-defined syntax. We noticed
that the syntaxes for the UA strings of these applications can be best specified using context-
free grammars (CFG) in terms of Backus-Naur Form (BNF). Using existing compiler tools, we
developed a baseline BNF-based UA string parser to recognize those that are generated by these
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Table I. Example User-Agent strings generated by popular browser types.
MSIE
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; .NET CLR 1.1.22315)
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; SV1; .NET CLR
2.0.50727)
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0.8112.16443; Windows NT 6.1)
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.2; Trident/6.0)
Firefox
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:29.0) Gecko/20120101 Firefox/29.0
Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.5; en-US; rv:1.9.0.7)
Gecko/2009021906 Firefox/3.0.7
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; SunOS i86pc; en-US; rv:1.9.0.6) Gecko/1986081808
Firefox/3.0.6
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; de-DE; rv:1.7.6) Gecko/20050306 Firefox/1.0.1
Chrome
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/37.0.2049.0 Safari/537.36
Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10 5 6; en-US) AppleWebKit/530.5
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/ Safari/530.5
Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; en-US) AppleWebKit/525.13 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/0.2.149.27 Safari/525.13
Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 4.0.3; GT-I9100 Build/IML74K) AppleWebKit/535.19
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/18.0.1025.133 Mobile Safari/535.19
Safari
Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10 6 7; en-us) AppleWebKit/534.16+
(KHTML, like Gecko) Version/5.0.3 Safari/533.19.4
Mozilla/5.0 (iPad; CPU OS 6 0 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/536.26 (KHTML, like
Gecko) Version/6.0 Mobile/10A5355d Safari/8536.25
Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; PPC Mac OS X; en-us) AppleWebKit/418.9 (KHTML, like
Gecko) Safari/419.3
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; it) AppleWebKit/522.13.1 (KHTML, like
Gecko) Version/3.0.2 Safari/522.13.1
Opera
Opera/9.80 (X11; Linux x86 64; U; en) Presto/2.9.168 Version/11.50
Opera/12.80 (Windows NT 5.1; U; zh-cn) Presto/2.10.289 Version/12.02
Opera/9.80 (X11; SunOS sun4u; U; en) Presto/2.2 Version/10.11
Opera/9.80 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.6.8; U; en) Presto/2.9.168
Version/11.52
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.0) Opera 12.14
standard applications and extract the type of application, OS version and device information. In the
following, we present our approach using popular web browsers as primary examples and discuss
the advantages of our BNF-based compiler approach.
Web browsers are perhaps the most popular application used on desktop and laptop machines. It is
no surprise that they comprise the majority of UA strings we see in our dataset. Table I shows some
examples of UA strings for common browsers found in our dataset. We see that the UA strings
generated by these browsers contain similar keywords and share certain structural components.
For example, the UA strings generated by IE browsers starts with the keywords “Mozilla/4.0” or
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“Mozilla/5.0”, followed only by a set of keywords enclosed by parentheses, including the “MSIE”
term and versions, Windows OS related information and the rendering engine “Trident/[version]”
(if present). However, the UA strings generated by Firefox, Chrome and Safari also begin with the
same keywords (most commonly with “Mozilla/5.0”), followed by a set of OS-related keywords
enclosed by “(...)”, and ended with a set of specific keywords starting with the rendering and layout
engines “Gecko” or “Applekit” and containing the browser type (e.g., Firefox, Chrome or Safari).
On the other hand, the UA strings for Opera browsers begin with “Opera/[version]” (except for
newer versions that also begin with “Mozilla/5.0”).
In the examples above, all standard browser UA strings manifest (nested) matching structures that
are characteristic of context-free languages, e.g., the prefix element “Mozilla/[4.0—5.0]” matches
a rendering engine-browser type suffix element (or an empty string in the case of IE browsers),
and the left parenthesis “(“ matches with the right parenthesis “)”. Furthermore, the rendering
engine-browser type suffix element also contains a matching structure, e.g., “Gecko/[version]”
matches only “Firefox/[version]” or “Opera/[version] and “Applekit/[version]” matches only with
“Safari/[version]”. These (nested) matching structures can be best recognized by push-down
automata, i.e., CFGs.
We define a set of CFG production rules using the BNF forms with non-terminal terms and
terminal terms (tokens). Some examples are shown in Table II, where the terms in angular brackets
<. . .> indicate non-terminal terms, and all other terms that never appear in the left of the production
rules (e.g., various symbols and strings inside quotation marks) are terminal terms (i.e., “tokens”).
In the above examples, note that “” denotes an empty string, while “ ” denotes a white space, and
“|. . . ” indicates that user-specific rules can be added there.
Leveraging existing compiler tools Flex [2] and Bison [1], we developed a parser for UA strings,
in order to classify and extract the browser type, OS, device and other relevant information if it
exists. The parser consists of two main components – a lexical analyzer and a syntax analyzer –
and operates in two phases: (i) the lexical analyzer first tokenizes a UA string and extracts each
meaningful element (i.e., the terminal terms); and (ii) the syntax analyzer applies the context-free
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Table II. Example production rules for browser UA strings.
<standard-browser>::=<browser-prefix>"("<OS-system>")"<browser-suffix>;
<browser-prefix>::="Mozilla/4.0"|"Mozilla/5.0"|"Opera/"<ver-1-dot>;
<browser-suffix>::=""|<host-info> <render-engine> <opera-version>|
<render-engine> <browser-type>|<browser-type>|...;
<host-info>::="(<OS-version> <security-level> <language>)"|
"(<OS-version> <security-level>)"|
"(<OS-version> <language>)"|
"(<OS-version>)"|...;
<render-engine>::="Presto/"<ver-two-dot>|
"Gecko/"<ver-no-dot>|
"AppleWebKit/"<ver-1-dot>|...;
<security-level>::="U"|"I"|...;
<language>::="en"|"es-ES"|"zh-cn"|"zh-tw"|"pl"|"cs"|...;
<OS-system>::="compatible;"<IE><window><IE-suffix>|<window>|<OSX>|...;
<window>::="Window NT "<version>|<additional-window-info>;
<additional-window-info>::="<.net>"|"<plugin>"|...
<.net>::=<.net>|".NET"<ver-1-dot>"C"|".NET"<ver-1-dot>"E"|".NET CLR "<ver-2-dot>;
<plugin>::="Media Center PC "<ver-1-dot>|...;
<IE>::="MSIE "<ver-1-more-dot>|...;
<browser-type>::="Firefox/"<ver-1-more-dot>|"Opera/"<ver-1-dot>|<chrome>|...;
<chrome-safari>::=<chrome-browser>" "<safari-type>|<safari-suffix>|...;
<chrome-browser>::="Chrome/"<ver-1-more-dot>" "<safari>|...;
<safari>::="Safari/"<ver-1-more-dot>|<mobile>"Safari/"<ver-1-more-dot>|...;
<mobile>::="Mobile"|"Mobile/"<alphanumeric-version-no-dot>"|...;
<opera-version>::="Version/"<ver-1-dot>;
<version>::=<ver-no-dot>|<ver-1-more-dot>;
<ver-1-more-dot>::=<ver-1-dot>|<ver-2-dot>|...;
<ver-no-dot>::=<digits>;
<ver-1-dot>::=<digits>"."<digits>;
<ver-2-dot>::=<digits>"."<ver-1-dot>;
<digits>::=<digit><digits>:
<digit>::="0"|"1"|...|"9";
BNF production rules to recognize the structure of a UA string that follows the rules and outputs
the browser type and other relevant information thus extracted, or otherwise rejects it together with
error messages indicating where the syntactic errors occur.
The advantages of context-free BNF-based parser approach for classifying (well-defined) UA
strings are the following: (i) it makes the parser scalable and extensible; when new types or versions
of browsers are created, we can simply add new production rules or version numbers in the existing
rules; (ii) in contrast to a UA parser relying purely on complex regular expression-based heuristics
(e.g., [7]), the resulting production rules are more modular and flexible for a human operator to
understand and manage; (iii) the error messages generated by the parser provide hints as to how a
UA string deviates from the expected standard UA strings, and can be utilized to detect anomalies;
and (iv) importantly, similar to “type checking” and other runtime techniques used for program
verification, we can plug in browser verification modules that incorporate “semantic” information
to check the validity of the UA strings that have passed the syntax parser. Such semantic constraints
Copyright c© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Network Mgmt (2015)
Prepared using nemauth.cls DOI: 10.1002/nem
13
can be verified at the last step by invoking appropriate browser verification modules based on the
browser type, OS and other relevant information extracted from the UA string that has passed the
syntax analyzer. In Section 6 we discuss how we exploit these last two features (iii) and (iv) to help
detect and identify “fake” browser UA strings generated by malicious applications.
The UA strings generated by standard iOS (and MacOS) applications also follow a well-defined
syntax: <app-name>/<version> CFNetwork/<version> Darwin/<version>. We have defined
production rules and developed a parser for parsing the UA strings generated by the standard
iOS/MacOS apps. For the UA strings that pass the grammar checking, the distinction between iOS
and MacOS is determined by the CFNetwork version number. Other “well-known” applications
such as Window Media Center, Media Player, Window Live, standard browser plug-ins, and
standard Android apps also follow well-defined syntaxes, and we have developed BNF-based
parsers for them.
4.3. Evaluation
To evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of our CFG-based parser, we compare it with a regex-
based UA string parser [7], the current state-of-the-art. UA strings are randomly chosen from our
dataset and parsed by both approaches. Then, the running time of each approach is recorded, as
shown in Table III. For parsing the same amount of UA strings, CFG-based parser are much more
efficient than regex-based parser. This is because [7] requires a linear scan over many regexes, which
degrades performance (see Section 4.1 for a detailed explanation).
Table III. UA String Parsing time (in seconds) for our CFGs and Regexes
# Strings 1 2 5 10 50 100 1,000 10,000 100,000
CFG-based parser 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.042 0.393
Regex-based parser 0.323 0.324 0.328 0.332 0.343 0.359 0.709 4.097 38.211
4.4. Dataset Analysis.
In our dataset we found more than 40 million HTTP flows and 94, 876 unique UA strings. Applying
our BNF-based UA string parsers for standard applications, we separated these unique UA strings
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Table IV. Standard browser and non-browser UA string classifications.
Category Browser-typeIE Chrome Firefox Opera Safari Mobile Browser Other Total
UAs 18,527 673 1,255 144 947 827 385 23,298
Flows 9,500,779 8,805,982 7,716,747 163,829 172,979 4,512,137 414,961 31,287,414
Category Non-BrowseriOS app Android app Other Total
UAs 7,425 871 667 8,963
Flows 1,075,071 56,910 67,244 1,199,225
into two categories: standard UA strings (32, 261 unique UA strings, about 34%), which matched
one of the BNF parsers (i.e., follow well-defined syntaxes), and non-standard UA strings (62, 615
unique strings, about 66%) that did not match any of the BNF parsers. As shown in Table IV, of
the standard UA strings, 23, 298 (24.6%) of them matched parsers for browsers and 8, 963 (9.4%)
matched non-browser parsers for iOS/MacOS, Android and other applications with well-defined
syntaxes.
5. HANDLING NON-STANDARD UA STRINGS
In Section 4, BNF grammar rules assign labels to user-agents based on their lexical structure.
However, not all UA strings follow the BNF grammar rules. Table V shows examples of this
type of UA strings. For instance, AV signature updates and OS updates lack structure and contain
random strings. To assign labels to user-agents in this category, we developed a heuristic that we
call hostname-based association.
We analyzed our dataset and noticed that many of the non-standard UA strings belong to specific
applications, such as AV software. AV software embeds local information (e.g. software version,
signatures database version, etc) in the UA string when checking for signature updates. Those UA
strings differ from browser UA strings in two aspects: (i) each UA string is unique as it includes a
SHA or MD5 hash of the information sent to the server; and (ii) the associated hostname to the UA
string belongs to one or two unique top-two level domain names e.g., all flows in this category
communicate with a specific AV such as kaspersky.com or kaspersky.net. Operating
system updates (e.g. for Windows and Mac), exhibit similar properties, but they are less random
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as they do not include any hash of the data. Our heuristic, which we describe below, tries to cover
both the AV and the OS update cases.
The key intuitions/ideas behind hostname association method is based on our analysis of the
UA strings in our dataset. We find that although there are a significant portion of “non-standard”
UA strings, they roughly fall into two categories: 1) UA strings containing mostly fairly random
alphanumeric characters; and 2) UA strings containing certain fixed keywords and some loose
defined structures. However, a key observation we have made is that the HOSTNAME field in the
HTTP flows containing these UA strings provide important hints regarding what type of applications
may have generated these UA strings. For instance, for the UA strings in category 1) above, there
is often a many-to-one mapping between the UA strings and the (top-2 level) domain name, and
the domain name is, say, mcafee.com or kaspersky.com, suggesting that these UA strings – despite
they are almost completely random-looking are generated by antivrus sotfware. Similarly, for many
UA strings in Category 2 are also a many-to-one mapping or a m-to-n mapping (where m is much
larger than n, and n is a smaller number, say, n=2, 3). Even when in some cases where n in the m-to-
n mapping is relatively larger, there are a few dominant hostnames (e.g., megaupload.com) which
reveal what the applications are, or there are certain patterns (e.g., keywords such as “tracker” or
“upload”) in the hostnames that echo the keywords in the UA strings (e.g., torrent, BTclient). Our
UA string-hostname association method basically applies these observations to heuristically label
and classify the non-standard applications (which fall into categories such as antivirus, software
update, p2p, media player, etc.). Hopefully this helps explain how the hostname association method
works.
To determine whether a UA string is “random” or not, we compute the entropy of the string. In
our testing, we have varied the entropy value from 2 bits/byte to 6 bits/byte and find that 4 bits/byte
yields the best result.
The flow grouper is used in our system to group all flows with the same top-level hostname
together so that we can generate the UA strings to hostname mappings. In terms of how much time
you retain the string in the “flow grouper”, for simplicity, we actually used the entire 24 hours — we
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Table V. Example UA strings generated by “non-standard” applications.
AV *
BIXBAAQAtbqDsWVZQ_L1CZHU621q0Js5LIqjj3zt9zUndLnKo5fwAodAAAAAAwAA
*BMXBAAQA1HYQpF6zZvbANVzMItmXgBUXcRSOrZ0oqVUT1keT2HD0AodAAAAAAwAA
SystemUpdate
Microsoft-CryptoAPI/5.131.2600.2180
Microsoft-CryptoAPI/5.131.2600.5512
P2P
BTWebClient/2000(17920)
uTorrent/1830(15638)
Unknown
C470IP021910000000
#2YX!!!!#=A@io!#3RM!!!#U=Q7fV!#3
have tested by varying the value from 1 hour, 4, 8, 12 and 24 hours. The results do not fundamentally
change very much — this is because the hostnames associated with the flows tend to be fairly stable.
The only difference is that when using smaller values, the size of flow groups is smaller. Our system
currently runs as an offline UA string classification system. Clearly, when running the system in an
“online” manner, a smaller value is likely preferred for fast classification. However, in such a case,
one can retain and utilize historical observations of the UA string-hostname associations to make
prediction. Investigating this subject is outside the scope of the current paper.
5.1. Algorithm Description
The hostname association is a two step process. In the first step, we compute the entropy of the
non-standard UA string by using a pseudorandom number sequence test program [16] to identify
those that are likely to be a SHA or MD5 hash. If the entropy is more than four bits/byte, we retain
this string in the “flow grouper” (see Figure 1) for a period of time. In the second step, for those UA
strings stored in the flow grouper, we count the number of top-two level domain names (extracted
from the HTTP hostname field) associated with each UA string. If the number of top-two level
domain names is equal to a certain threshold (e.g. we chose 1 for software update), we consider this
UA string as associated with a specific application and assign the label based on the corresponding
top-two level domain name.
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5.2. Evaluation
To evaluate this algorithm, we first build our ground truth. For this, we analyzed our dataset with the
CFG-based parsers in order to identify those non-standard UA strings. After this, we manually
identified the cases that are AV and then compared them with the results from our algorithm.
We achieved promising results, with precision of 0.9039 and recall of 0.9463. Figure 2 shows the
Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF) and the number of unknown UA strings
after (i) applying the BNF parsing only, and (ii) after using the hostname association as well. The
results show that we effectively reduce the number of unknown UA strings using our proposed
heuristics. The percentage of clients having more than five unknown UA strings reduced from 80%
to 50% after using the hostname association.
5.3. Data Analysis
In our dataset, non-standard UA strings (62, 615) pass through the hostname association to filter
application-aware cases (58, 522, 61.7%), where the majority are AV (53, 448). More detailed
statistics are shown in Table VI.
Table VI. Hostname association for non-standard UA strings.
Category Hostname-based AssociationAV SystemUpdate P2P Other TotalNorton AVG Other Window Google Other BT uTorrent Other
UAs 42,552 3,937 6,959 1,143 769 113 120 84 78 2,860 58,522
Flows 55,910 68,233 1,391,339 1,373,779 937,834 182,381 63,921 93,425 132,834 1,373,779 5,673,435
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Figure 2. Unknown UA strings after different classification schemes.
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6. MALICIOUS UA DETECTION
In this section, we demonstrate the utility of the UA analysis in identifying anomalies in host
activity and in detecting malicious activities. As a proof of concept, we provide three basic inference
engines: fake UA string detection, fake OS detection, anomaly detection, for detecting suspicious
standard UA strings, and signature based inference engine for detecting suspicious non-standard UA
strings.
We note that parsing process described in above sections by itself does not tell us whether a UA
string is fake or not, as a UA string which can pass the standard format check can still be fake. This
is where the application profiles extracted from the UA strings come into play. Given HTTP flows
generated by a single client IP address that is associated with a single device to separate and group
flows based on devices, we build application profiles based on the information extracted from the
UA strings, which tell us what OS (and its version) and common applications (and their versions)
are running on the device. These application profiles are used by the inference engines to detect fake
(or generally malicious) UA strings. In particular, we look for conflicting information contained in
the application profiles. Clearly, detecting fake UA strings (especially when they pass the standard
format check) hinges on many contextual and other information contained in the HTTP flows, and
so forth. For example, in general given a Window machine, only one version/instance of the IE
browser can be running. When we see multiple versions of IE are running, or a version of IE is
running on the wrong OS version, this signifies that some of these are fake.
To evaluate these inference engines, we first build our ground truth. We primarily use the
commercial IDS to help us separate client machines that are infected with malware vs. those that are
not. We use the UA strings extracted from HTTP flows generated by standard applications running
on the “clean” machines as samples for context-free grammar specifications. We also check the
formats obtained from these samples against those generated from test machines as well as other
sources of UA lists. Apart from this, we also use the malware labels generated by the IDS to help
us confirm the fake/malicious UA strings we have detected by our system. More specific, we apply
inference engines to analyzing clients infected by Backdoor.Tidserv (aka Tidserv). Tidserv is a
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Trojan horse that displays advertisements, redirects user search results, and opens back doors [4].
There are 14 clients which have already been labeled as Tidserv by a commercial IDS in our dataset.
We hope that the readers of our paper can see the utility of our methodology from the inference
engines we designed. Based on the methodology described above, security analysts can develop
their own heuristics according to the concrete problem they are targeting. We begin by presenting
suspicious standard UA strings and then continue to show suspicious non-standard UA strings.
6.1. Suspicious Standard UA Strings
Fake User-Agent Detection. In inference engine, fake UA detection, we aim to detect fake UA
strings which contains conflicting information in UA string itself. As we know, a significant number
of UA strings can pass the BNF grammar defined in Section 4 and be classified as standard UA
strings. However, not all of them are valid as mentioned above. From the left and middle parts of
Figure 3, we can see that the number of UA strings and Browser type UA strings in the 14 Tidserv
clients are more than those in 100 randomly selected clean clients. This indicates the possibility of
fraudulent UA strings generated by Tidserv clients. Given the UA string in Table VII, we suppose it
to be generated by a Firefox browser version 2.0. According to the Firefox official site, however, we
find that Firefox 2.0 is supported by Windows 98 and other recent OS versions, but not by Windows
95. Nevertheless, the UA string is correctly parsed by our CFG.
Moreover, consider the case of “browser-prefix” and “rendering-engine” rules defined in Table II.
Note that in practice, not all browsers are valid with all rendering engines. For example, browser
MSIE is only associated with engine “Trident”, and if it is associated with another engine such as
Gecko or Presto, the UA string tends to be fraudulent.
Combining the aforementioned cases, in order to improve our system, we plan to develope a basic
type checking system that checks the dependency between keywords in different terms. This idea is
borrowed from runtime type checking in compilers. The linkages can be created between terms by
crawling sites, such as [9], to obtain all possible valid combinations of terms and the type checker
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can enforce them after the BNF parsing. Administrators can also specify their own dependencies in
the type checking system.
Table VII. Example suspicious UA strings.
Examples
Suspicious
standard
UA strings
fake UA
detection Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U ; Win95; it; rv: 1.8.1) Gecko/20061010 Firefox/2.0
fake OS
detection Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0b; Windows NT 5.0; .NET CLR 1.0.2914)
anomaly
detection
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1) AppleWebKit/535.19 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/18.0.1025.152 Safari/535.19
Suspicious
non-standard
UA strings
suspicious
standard
UA strings
User-Agent: NULL
Trojan Brontok A11
MSlE
Fake Operating System Detection. In inference engine, fake OS detection, we aim to detect fake
UA strings which contains conflicting information with contextual information contained in the
HTTP flows, particularly OS information contained in HTTP flows. OS information can either
be inferred from most standard UA strings or OS fingerprinting mechanisms by utilizing pieces
of information contained in lower layers (below application layer in ISO model). However, the
OS information inferred from UA strings and lower layers could be different. This gives us the
indication that UA string could be fake. From the right side of Figure 3, we can see the number of
OSes inferred from the UA strings in Tidserv clients is more than that in clean clients. This indicates
that the OSes information inferred from fraudulent UA strings might not match the actual OS of the
device that generated the corresponding HTTP flow. In order to check whether there are such OS
conflicts, we resort to OS fingerprinting mechanisms. The tool we use is “p0f v3”, which utilizes
an array of sophisticated, purely passive traffic fingerprinting mechanisms to identify the players
behind any incidental TCP/IP communications [10].
We ran p0f through Tidserv clients and identified many inconsistent HTTP flows, where the OS
inferred from the UA string by our parser is different from the OS provided by p0f. However, such
OS conflicts are not found in clean clients. For example, given the UA string in Table VII, it is
supposed to be generated by a Windows 2000 machine according to its NT version. However, from
the p0f results, the HTTP flow is generated by a Window 7 machine. To further verify this (since p0f
might be wrong), we manually went through all the HTTP flows generated from this Tidserv client
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and found that no other flows were associated with Windows 2000. In addition, by doing a HTTP
referer analysis on this flow, we found that the referred hostname associated with this UA string was
never accessed by the monitored client, which indicates a potential click-fraud event. Surprisingly,
we found that all 6 clients infected with both Tidserv and Trojan.Zeroaccess [5], generate all the UA
strings with OS conflicts. We found a total of 8 distinct fake OSes. We hypothesize that Zeroaccess
has a simple codebase that randomly picks a UA from standard UA strings pool without checking
the OS of the device that is running the malware.
Anomaly Detection. In inference engine, anomaly detection, we aim to detect fake UA strings from
statistic analysis. It is possible for fraudulent UA strings to pass the CFG-based parser, the fake UA
detection and the fake OS detection. In this case, we rely on further statistical analysis to identify
suspicious hosts. Those fraudulent UA strings can also be found in the Tidserv infected clients.
From the statistics of the 14 Tidserv clients in our dataset, the number of standard browsers in those
clients is larger than that in clean clients as shown in Figure 3. This indicates a suspicious behavior,
as in normal cases, we expect very few browsers being used in a single household.
To better understand the reason for the large number of standard browser UA strings in Tidserv
clients, we chose a Tidserv client and digged into it. In this client, there were 12 standard browser
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UA strings, including different versions of Chrome, RockMelt and Internet Explorer. We found that
one of the Chrome UA strings as shown in Table VII was the most frequently used and default for
that client, but other UA strings belonged to browsers that were used sporadically and appeared only
around flows flagged by the commercial IDS as Tidserv. Investigation showed that the flows with
RockMelt and some other standard browser UA strings were directed to advertisement networks
(e.g., ad.zanox.com and ad.doubleclick.net) to perform click fraud. This shows that a statistical
analysis on top of the presented UA analysis can indeed help identify anomalous clients.
6.2. Suspicious Non-Standard UA Strings
For non-standard UA strings, studies [14] [23] show that some of them are often associated with
the malicious activities. Thus, we design signature based inference engine to detect suspicious UA
strings in non-standard UA strings. After hostname association, if non-standard UA strings cannot
be associated with well-known applications, they are classified into “Unknown UA Strings”. For
UA strings in this category, our system depends on the signature collected from domain knowledge
and other sources of information, to judge whether they are normal or not. In our system, we set
basic signatures collected from various online sources like [17].
As shown in Table VII, these UA strings are filterd by signature based inference engine in Tidserv
clients. Since and HTTP server would not be able to perform any improvements on user experience
based that UA string, “User-Agent: NULL” is abnormal. For the HTTP flows associated with this
UA string, VirusTotal [3] reported that the associated hostname is a malicious software download
site. Another example in Tidserv clients was the UA string “Trojan Brontok A11”, which infects
Windows machines. Note that the bot name is written in the UA string, which could be used as
a signal for the C&C server to identify flows from infected clients. The third example in Tidserv
clients was a mis-spelling in the UA string. The UA contains “MSlE” (note the lower case “L”)
instead of “MSIE” (the upper case “I”). After searching for this UA string, we found it associated
with malware Troj/Agent-VUD.
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We can envisage that our system can be augmented with rich signatures in the UA strings that do
not pass our CFG-based and hostname association UA string classifiers, such as XSS, SQL injection
attacks that are embedded in the UA strings. Such a system may prevent a client machine to launch
XSS, SQL injections to a targeted server. If running on the server side, our system can simply only
allows HTTP requests with legitimate standard web browsers or mobile apps to be forwarded to the
server under protection, thereby filtering out ill-formed UA strings (which contain, e.g., malicious
SQL commands for compromising a vulnerable server).
7. CONCLUSION
Most cyber attacks today are performed over HTTP and the UA string carries a lot of critical
information that can be leveraged to detect them. We presented a system that identifies fraudulent
UA strings by categorizing the strings based on their syntactic format and running a set of inference
engines. We classified the standard UA strings with a novel grammar-guided approach, which
leverages context-free grammar to parse and extract application name, device and operating system
information. In addition, we developed a heuristic to classify non-standard UA strings by associating
them with the hostname field of the corresponding HTTP flow. We devised three inference engines
to identify fraudulent UA strings: fake UA string detection, fake OS detection and anomaly detection
using statistical features. Finally, we provided several case studies to demonstrate how our approach
can lead us to identify malicious applications.
We recognize that our proposed UA string classification methodology is only meant to be one
useful tool of a larger arsenal of tools that a security analyst can leverage for detecting malicious
activities and attacks. This is because by only considering the UA string of HTTP flows for anomaly
detection, we may miss HTTP attacks where the UA string is not the key indicator. In addition, for
the case of non-standard UA strings, we currently provide a very basic level of inference, which is
not enough to differentiate benign from malicious cases and requires human analysis. Nevertheless,
in this paper, we have described and showed the potential of a methodology capable of highlighting
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abnormalities in the HTTP behavior of clients by focusing on UA string analysis, even when the
anomalies are very subtle (e.g. valid UA strings but conflicts in the OS advertised).
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